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America’s Social 
Democratic Future
The Arc of Policy Is Long But Bends 
Toward Justice
Lane Kenworthy 
Since March 2010, when U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Affordable Care Act into law, the aca has been at the center of American politics. Tea Party activists and their allies in the 
Republican Party have tried to stymie the law at nearly every turn. 
The Republican-controlled House of Representatives has voted more 
than 40 times in favor of repealing or defunding it, and last October 
the House allowed a partial shutdown of the federal government in an 
attempt to block or delay the law. The controversy surrounding the 
aca shows no sign of ending anytime soon.
Obamacare, as the law is commonly known, is the most significant 
reform of the U.S. health-care system in half a century. It aims to 
increase the share of Americans who have health insurance, improve the 
quality of health insurance plans, and slow the growth of health-care 
spending. But the fight over the law is about more than just health-care 
policy, and the bitterness of the conflict is driven by more than just 
partisan polarization. Obamacare has become the central battleground 
in an ongoing war between liberals and conservatives over the size and 
scope of the U.S. government, a fight whose origins stretch back to the 
Great Depression and the New Deal. 
Opponents of President Franklin Roosevelt’s innovations were si-
lenced when the New Deal’s reforms were locked in during the Truman 
and Eisenhower years, and the U.S. welfare state took another leap 
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forward under Lyndon Johnson, whose Great Society agenda expanded 
public help for the poor and created the government-administered 
health insurance programs Medicare and Medicaid. But the following 
decades saw few major additions and some notable setbacks, including 
the failure of President Bill Clinton’s health-care reform effort in 1994. 
The passage of Obamacare has caused such controversy in part be-
cause it seems to signal a new stage of government activism, leading 
some conservatives to oppose it as a decisive and possibly inexorable turn 
to the left. “Precisely because the Affordable Care Act is the realization 
of a half-century long liberal dream,” the conservative commentator 
Peter Wehner wrote recently in The Weekly Standard, “if it fails, it will be 
a crushing blow not just to Barack Obama but to American liberalism 
itself. Why? Because Obamacare is in many ways the avatar, the arche-
type, of modern liberalism. That’s true in terms of its coercive elements, 
its soaring confidence in technocratic solutions, its ambition to centralize 
decisionmaking, and its belief that government knows best.” 
Such apocalyptic arguments vastly overstate Obamacare’s practical sig-
nificance. But they also obscure the more interesting reality, which is that 
the aca represents another step on a long, slow, but steady journey away 
from the classical liberal capitalist state and toward a peculiarly American 
version of social democracy. Unlike in, say, northern Europe, where social 
democracy has been enacted deliberately and comprehensively over the 
years by ideologically self-aware political movements, in the United 
States, a more modest and patchy social safety net has been pieced 
together by pragmatic politicians and technocrats tackling individual 
problems. Powerful forces will continue to fight those efforts, and the 
resulting social insurance policies will emerge more gradually and be less 
universal, less efficient, and less effective than they would otherwise have 
been. But the opponents are fighting a losing battle and can only slow 
down and distort the final outcome rather than stop it. Thanks to a com-
bination of popular demand, technocratic supply, and gradually increas-
ing national wealth, social democracy is the future of the United States.
NORDIC MODELS
Social democracy originated in the early twentieth century as a strategy 
to improve capitalism rather than replace it. Today, people generally 
associate it with European social democratic political parties and the 
policies they have put in place, especially those in the Nordic coun-
tries, such as Denmark and Sweden. Over the course of the next half 
America’s Social Democratic Future
 January/February 2014 89
century, the array of social programs offered by the federal govern-
ment of the United States will increasingly come to resemble the ones 
offered by those countries.
This prediction means something quite different today than it would 
have a generation ago, when the label “social democratic” referred quite 
narrowly to policies that made it easier for people to survive with little 
or no reliance on earnings from employ-
ment. In the 1960s and 1970s, the prac-
tice of social democracy mostly meant 
maintaining a large public safety net. 
Today, that’s too narrow a conception. 
In recent decades, the Nordic countries 
have supplemented their generous social programs with services aimed 
at boosting employment and enhancing productivity: publicly funded 
child care and preschool, job-training and job-placement programs, 
significant infrastructure projects, and government support for private-
sector research and development. At the same time, the Nordic govern-
ments have adopted a market-friendly approach to regulation. Although 
they maintain regulations to protect workers, consumers, and the envi-
ronment, they balance those protections with a system that encourages 
entrepreneurship and flexibility by making it easy to start or close a 
business, to hire or fire employees, and to adjust work hours.
As pioneered by the Nordic countries, modern social democracy 
means a commitment to the extensive use of government policy to 
promote economic security, expand opportunity, and ensure rising 
living standards for all. But it aims to do so while also safeguarding 
economic freedom, economic flexibility, and market dynamism, all of 
which have long been hallmarks of the U.S. economy. The Nordic 
countries’ experience demonstrates that a government can successfully 
combine economic flexibility with economic security and foster social 
justice without stymieing competition. Modern social democracy offers 
the best of both worlds.
Still, the notion that the United States is likely to further increase the 
size and scope of its welfare state might seem blind to the reality of con-
temporary American politics. But step back and consider the long run. 
The lesson of the past hundred years is that as the United States grows 
wealthier, Americans become more willing to spend more to insure 
against risk and enhance fairness. Advances in social policy come only 
intermittently, but they do come. And when they come, they usually last.
Opponents of American-
style social democracy are 
fighting a losing battle.
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That trend is likely to continue. U.S. policymakers will recognize the 
benefits of a larger government role in pursuing economic security, equal 
opportunity, and rising living standards and will attempt to move the 
country in that direction. Often, they will fail. But sometimes, they will 
succeed. Progress will be incremental, coming in fits and starts, as it has 
in the past. New programs and expansions of existing ones will tend to 
persist, because programs that work well become popular and because 
the U.S. policymaking process makes it difficult for opponents of social 
programs to remove them. Small steps and the occasional big leap, 
coupled with limited backsliding, will have the cumulative effect of 
significantly increasing the breadth and generosity of government 
social programs.
This is not a prediction about the timing or conditions under which 
specific policy advances will occur. It’s a hypothesis about a probabilistic 
process. Over the long run, new programs will occasionally be created 
and existing ones will occasionally be expanded, and these additions and 
expansions are unlikely to be reversed.
FALLING SHORT
To understand why the United States is on the path to social democ-
racy, one must recognize that although it is a rich country—and in the 
next half century, it will grow even richer—it nevertheless suffers 
from serious economic failings. These are deep-seated problems; 
although exacerbated by the Great Recession and the feeble recovery, 
they predate the country’s recent economic troubles.
First, the United States does not ensure enough economic security for 
its citizens. Too many Americans have incomes so low that they struggle 
to make ends meet: among the 25 million households in the bottom fifth 
on the income ladder, average income is just $18,000 a year. Too many 
Americans experience sizable income declines: each year, about one 
in seven U.S. households suffers a drop in annual income of 25 percent 
or more. Too many Americans have no health insurance: even when 
Obamacare is fully implemented, between five and ten percent of U.S. 
citizens still won’t have coverage, a far higher share than in any other rich 
nation. Finally, too many Americans will soon reach retirement age with 
little savings and inadequate pensions: average household savings as a 
share of disposable household income fell from ten percent during the 
1970s to just three percent during the first decade of this century, many 
employees with defined-contribution pension plans contribute very 
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little to them or cash them in early, and the bursting of the housing 
bubble depleted the sole asset of many middle-class homeowners.
Second, the country is failing in its promise of equal opportunity. 
Most women and many African Americans now have a much better 
chance to obtain an advanced education and to thrive in the labor market 
than did their counterparts a generation ago. Yet the story for Americans 
who grow up poor is much less encouraging. Among affluent countries 
for which data are available, the United States has one of the lowest 
levels of intergenerational earnings mobility. An American born into a 
family in the bottom fifth of incomes between the mid-1960s and the 
mid-1980s has roughly a 30 percent chance of reaching the middle fifth 
or higher in adulthood, whereas an American born into the top fifth has 
an 80 percent chance of ending up in the middle fifth or higher. More-
over, recent decades have witnessed large increases in the gaps between 
the test scores and college completion rates of children from low-income 
families and those from high-income families, and the same will likely be 
true for their earnings and incomes when they reach adulthood.
Third, too few Americans have shared in the prosperity their country 
has enjoyed in recent decades. In a good society, those in the middle 
and at the bottom ought to benefit significantly from economic growth. 
When the country prospers, everyone should prosper. But since the 
1970s, despite sustained growth in the economy, the incomes of house-
holds in the middle and below have risen very slowly compared with 
those at the top. According to calculations by the Congressional Budget 
Office that account for inflation, the average income for households in 
the top one percent soared from $350,000 in 1979 to $1.3 million 
in 2007. For the bottom 60 percent, the rise was quite modest: from 
$30,000 to $37,000.
These failures owe in part to changes in the global economy, especially 
the increasing competition faced by U.S. firms. American companies 
selling goods or services in international markets confront foreign 
rivals that are far more capable than in the past. Domestic industries 
face more competition, too, as technological advances, falling con-
struction and transportation costs, and deregulation have reduced 
barriers to entry. In addition, shareholders now want rapid appreciation 
in stock values. Whereas a generation ago, investors in a company 
were happy with a consistent dividend payment and some long-term 
increase in the firm’s stock price, they now demand buoyant quarterly 
profits and constant growth. 
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These shifts benefit investors, consumers, and some employees. 
But they encourage companies to resist pay increases, drop health 
insurance plans, cut contributions to employee pensions, move 
abroad, downsize, and replace regular employees with temporary 
ones—or computers. Such cost-cutting strategies end up weakening 
economic security, limiting opportunities for low-skilled labor, and 
reducing income growth for many ordinary Americans—trends that 
are certain to continue into the foreseeable future. In the coming 
decades, more Americans will lose a job, work for long stretches 
without a pay increase, work part time or irregular hours, and go 
without an employer-backed pension plan or health insurance. 
Some believe that the best way to address the stresses and strains of 
the new economy is to strengthen families, civic organizations, or labor 
unions. Those are laudable aims. But these institutions have been unrav-
eling over the past half century, and although advocates of revitalizing 
them offer lots of hope, they can point to little evidence of success. 
An influential faction in Washington favors a different solution: 
shrink the federal government. According to this view, reducing taxes 
and government spending will improve efficiency, limit waste, and 
enhance incentives for investment, entrepreneurship, and hard work, 
leading to faster economic growth. But this approach is predicated on 
the false notion that the growth of government limits the growth of 
the private sector. Over the course of the past century, the United 
States has gradually expanded government spending, from 12 percent 
of gdp in 1920 to 37 percent in 2007. Throughout that period, the 
country’s growth rate remained remarkably steady. Other evidence 
comes from abroad: among the world’s rich nations, those with higher 
taxes and government expenditures have tended to grow just as rap-
idly as those with smaller governments. Moreover, even if cutting 
taxes and reducing federal spending did produce faster growth, the 
record of the past few decades suggests that too little of that growth 
would benefit Americans in the middle and below.
Another possible response to this state of affairs is to grin and bear 
it. In this view, there is little anyone can do to ameliorate the ill effects 
of the modern economy, so the wisest course of action for ordinary 
Americans is to adjust their expectations and carry on. But the United 
States can do better than that—and the best way to address the coun-
try’s socioeconomic failings is to expand public insurance.
Lane Kenworthy
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RISKS AND REWARDS
Most of what social scientists call “social policy” is actually public 
insurance. Social Security and Medicare insure individuals against 
the risk of having little or no money after they retire. Unemployment 
compensation insures individuals against the risk of losing their jobs. 
Disability payment programs insure against the risk of individuals’ 
suffering physical, mental, or psychological conditions that render 
them unable to earn a living.
Other U.S. public services and benefits are also insurance programs, 
even if people don’t usually think of them that way. Public schools insure 
against the risk that private schools will be unavailable, too expensive, or 
of low quality. Retraining and job-placement programs insure against 
the risk that market conditions will make it difficult to find employment. 
The Earned Income Tax Credit insures against the risk that one’s job will 
pay less than what is necessary for a minimally decent standard of living. 
Social assistance programs, such as food stamps and Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families, insure against the risk of being unable to get a 
job but ineligible for unemployment or disability compensation.
Over the past century, the United States, like other rich nations, has 
created a number of public insurance programs. But to achieve genuine 
economic security, equal opportunity, and shared prosperity in the new 
economy, over the course of the next half century, the federal govern-
ment will need to greatly expand the range and scope of its existing 
social insurance programs and introduce new programs.
The government could help low-income American households with 
one or more employed adults by increasing the statutory minimum wage 
and indexing it to inflation and by increasing the benefit offered by the 
Earned Income Tax Credit, particularly for households without children, 
for whom the credit currently provides only a small amount. For house-
holds in which no one is employed, the solution is more complicated. 
Those who can make it in the labor market should be helped and pushed 
to do so, which will require extensive, individualized assistance. The 
federal government should also increase the benefit levels and ease 
the eligibility criteria for its key social assistance programs: Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, general assistance, food stamps, housing 
assistance, and energy assistance. 
Several initiatives could help reduce the incidence of large involuntary 
declines in income: public sickness insurance, paid parental leave, and 
expanded access to unemployment insurance. Currently, nearly one-third 
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of American workers get no paid sick leave, U.S. law requires only 12 
weeks of unpaid parental leave, and only 40 percent of unemployed 
Americans qualify for unemployment compensation. The United States 
would also benefit from a wage insurance program. For Americans who 
get laid off and cannot find a job that pays as well as their prior one, wage 
insurance would fill half of the gap between the former pay and the new 
lower wage for a year or two. 
By boosting the incomes of poor households with children, an 
increase in the Child Tax Credit would help reverse the widening 
gap in inequality of opportunity. Schools help offset gaps in childrens’ 
capabilities that result from differences in families and neighbor-
hoods. Having children enter school earlier in life could reduce the 
disparities that exist when they arrive 
for kindergarten. Indeed, some ana-
lysts have concluded that the impact 
of schooling is largest during the pre-
kindergarten years.
For the elderly, a helpful addition 
to the U.S. safety net would be a sup-
plemental defined-contribution pen-
sion plan with automatic enrollment. Employers that have an existing 
plan could continue it, but they would have to automatically enroll 
all employees and deduct a portion of their earnings unless an employee 
elected to opt out. Employees without access to an employer-sponsored 
plan would be automatically enrolled in the new universal retirement 
fund, and workers whose employers did not match their contributions 
would be eligible for matching from the government.
The final piece of the economic-security puzzle would take the form 
of increased federal spending on public child care, roads and bridges, and 
health care and federal rules mandating more holidays and vacations for 
workers. Such changes would raise all Americans’ quality of life and free 
up their income for purchasing other goods and services.
What about shared prosperity? The best way to ensure that house-
hold incomes rise in sync with the economy would be to get wages 
and employment rising again for those in the middle and below. 
Adjusting for inflation, the wages of ordinary Americans have not 
increased since the mid-1970s, and the employment rate is lower 
now than it was in 2000. Policymakers also ought to consider a pub-
lic insurance remedy: not only increase the benefit offered by the 
Social insurance allows  
a modern economy to hedge 
against risks without relying 
on stifling regulations.
Lane Kenworthy
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Earned Income Tax Credit but offer the credit to middle-income 
Americans and index it to gdp per capita.
Of course, spending on insurance comes at a price. Americans 
will need to pay more in taxes. Moreover, the existence of insurance 
increases the incentive for people to engage in risky behavior or to 
avoid employment. However, insurance also has economic benefits. 
Better education and health care improve productivity. Bankruptcy 
protection encourages entrepreneurship. Unemployment compensation 
encourages a more mobile work force and makes it easier for workers 
to improve their skills. Programs such as the Child Tax Credit and 
the Earned Income Tax Credit enhance the educational and economic 
prospects of children who grow up in poor households. And, crucially, 
social insurance allows a modern economy to hedge against risks with-
out relying on stifling regulations that specify what businesses can 
and cannot do.
The experience of the world’s rich countries over the past century 
should allay the fear that growth in the size and scope of public social 
programs will weaken the U.S. economy. There surely is a level beyond 
which public social spending hurts economic growth. But the evidence 
indicates that the United States has not yet reached that level. In fact, 
the country is probably still well below it.
BIG PRICE TAG, BIGGER PAYOFF
Some observers, even many on the left, worry about the applicability 
of Nordic-style policies—which have succeeded in the context of 
small, relatively homogeneous countries—to a large, diverse nation 
such as the United States. Yet moving toward social democracy in the 
United States would mostly mean asking the federal government to 
do more of what it already does. It would not require shifting to a 
qualitatively different social contract. 
But can the United States afford social democracy? Although the 
added cost of creating the new programs and expansions described above 
while also maintaining Social Security and Medicare would depend on 
the exact scope and generosity of the programs, a rough estimate of the 
cost is an additional ten percent of U.S. gdp, or around $1.5 trillion. (An 
economic downturn, such as the one precipitated by the financial crisis 
of 2008, tends to skew gdp and tax revenue figures, so it is best to use 
data from 2007, the peak year of the precrash business cycle.) If ten 
percent of gdp sounds massive, keep in mind two things: First, if U.S. 
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government expenditures rose from 37 percent of gdp, their 2007 
level, to around 47 percent, that would place the United States only 
a few percentage points above the current norm among the world’s 
rich nations. Second, an increase in government spending of ten 
percent of gdp would be much smaller than the increase of around 
25 percent that occurred between 1920 and today. 
As a technical matter, revising the U.S. tax code to raise the addi-
tional funds would be relatively simple. The first and most important 
step would be to introduce a national 
consumption tax in the form of a value-
added tax (vat), which the government 
would levy on goods and services at 
each stage of their production and dis-
tribution. Analyses by Robert Barro, 
Alan Krueger, and other economists 
suggest that a vat at a rate of 12 percent, 
with limited exemptions, would likely bring in about five percent of 
gdp in revenue—half the amount required to fund the expansions in 
social insurance proposed here.
Relying heavily on a consumption tax is anathema to some pro-
gressives, who believe additional tax revenues should come mainly—
perhaps entirely—from the wealthiest households. Washington, however, 
cannot realistically squeeze an additional ten percent of gdp in tax 
revenues solely from those at the top, even though the well-off are 
receiving a steadily larger share of the country’s pretax income. Since 
1960, the average effective federal tax rate (tax payments to the 
federal government as a share of pretax income) paid by the top five 
percent of households has never exceeded 37 percent, and in recent 
years, it has been around 29 percent. To raise an additional ten per-
cent of gdp in tax revenues solely from this group, that effective tax 
rate would have to increase to 67 percent. Whether desirable or not, 
an increase of this magnitude won’t find favor among policymakers.
A mix of other changes to the tax system could generate an additional 
five percent of gdp in tax revenues: a return to the federal income tax 
rates that applied prior to the administration of President George W. 
Bush, an increase of the average effective federal tax rate for the top 
one percent of taxpayers to about 37 percent, an end to the tax deduc-
tion for interest paid on mortgage loans, new taxes on carbon dioxide 
emissions and financial transactions, an increase in the cap on earnings 
In the long run, the GOP 
will come to resemble 
center-right parties in 
western Europe.
Lane Kenworthy
98 f o r e i g n  a f fa i r s
that are subject to the Social Security payroll tax, and a one percent 
increase in the payroll tax rate.
POLITICAL SPEED BUMPS, NOT ROADBLOCKS
These kinds of tax reforms and the social insurance programs they 
would fund will not arrive all at once. It will be a slow process, partly 
owing to a series of obstacles that social democratic ideas are sure to 
face. But none of the barriers is likely to prove insurmountable. 
One basic problem, critics might point out, is that Americans 
aren’t fond of the idea of big government. Although this is true at an 
abstract level, when it comes to specific government programs, 
Americans tend to be strongly supportive. For instance, according to 
the National Opinion Research Center’s General Social Survey, since 
the 1970s, a large majority of Americans—always over 80 percent and 
often more than 90 percent—have said that they believe the govern-
ment currently spends the right amount or too little on assistance to 
the poor, on enhancing the nation’s education system, on improving 
and protecting the nation’s health, and on funding Social Security. 
Skeptics might also note that expanding social programs will hinge 
on electoral success by Democrats, and it is possible that the Demo-
cratic Party’s fortunes are dimming. Democrats have lost support 
among working-class whites, a main element of the New Deal coali-
tion that dominated U.S. politics from the 1930s through the 1970s. 
Yet Democratic presidential and congressional candidates have fared 
well with a new electoral base of city-dwelling professionals, women, 
African Americans, and Latinos. The flood of private money into 
election campaigns, encouraged by the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens 
United ruling, might put Democrats at a fundraising disadvantage. 
But private campaign contributions have been growing in importance 
for several decades, and so far, the Democrats have managed to keep 
up. And although demographics, electoral coalitions, and campaign 
funding certainly matter, the condition of the economy tends to be 
the chief determinant of the outcome of national elections. If Demo-
crats manage the economy reasonably well when in they are in charge, 
they are likely to remain electorally competitive.
Another potential roadblock is the rightward shift in the balance of 
power among organized interests outside the electoral arena, which exert 
substantial influence on policymaking. Since the 1970s, businesses and 
affluent individuals have mobilized, while the labor movement has steadily 
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declined in membership. Yet this shift has managed to only slow, not 
stop, the advance of progressive social policy.
A final potential obstacle to American social democracy is the struc-
ture of the U.S. political system, in which it is relatively easy to block 
policy changes through congressional maneuvering or effective vetoes. 
Given this structure, the kind of disciplined obstructionism demon-
strated by congressional Republicans during Obama’s tenure would 
surely threaten the forward march of public insurance. Sooner or later, 
however, Republican leaders will turn away from the staunch antigov-
ernment orientation that has shaped the party’s strategy and tactics in 
recent years. In the long run, the center of gravity in the Republican 
Party will shift, and the gop will come to resemble center-right parties 
in western Europe, most of which accept a generous welfare state and 
relatively high taxes. 
Three things could potentially trigger such a shift. One is a loss by 
a very conservative Republican candidate in an otherwise winnable 
presidential election. If the party were to nominate a member of its 
far-right or libertarian faction in 2016 or 2020, that candidate would 
almost certainly lose, which would prompt a move back toward the 
center. Another factor favoring Republican moderation is the growing 
importance to the party of working-class whites. Recently, several 
thoughtful and prominent right-of-center voices, such as David Brooks, 
Ross Douthat, David Frum, Charles Murray, Ramesh Ponnuru, and 
Reihan Salam, have noted that working-class whites are struggling 
economically and could benefit from government help. To shore up 
electoral support among this group, more top Republicans will come to 
favor—or at least not oppose—the expansion of programs such as the 
Child Tax Credit, early education, the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
Social Security, and even Medicare and Medicaid.
Perhaps most important, clear thinkers on the right will eventually 
realize that given Americans’ desire for economic security and fairness, 
the question is not whether the government should intervene but 
how it should do so. An expansion of social programs would not 
necessarily mean more government interference in markets and 
weaker competition. Here again, the Nordic countries can show the 
way. The conservative Heritage Foundation collaborates with The 
Wall Street Journal in a project that grades countries on ten dimen-
sions of economic freedom. Although the United States has lower 
taxes and lower government spending than the Nordic countries, 
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Denmark, Finland, and Sweden score better, on average, on the other 
eight measures, including the right to establish and run an enterprise 
without interference from the state, the number of regulatory barriers 
to imports and exports, and the number of restrictions on the move-
ment of capital. Americans want protection and support. To deliver 
those things, policymakers must choose between public insurance 
and regulation, and conservatives ought to prefer the former.
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA
Perhaps what is most important to note about the United States’ 
social democratic future is that it will not look dramatically different 
from the present day. The United States will not become a progressive 
utopia; rather, it will become a better version of its current self. 
A larger share of adults will be employed, although for many, the 
workweek will be shorter and there will be more vacation days and 
holidays. Nearly all jobs will be in the service sector, especially teach-
ing, advising, instructing, organizing, aiding, nursing, monitoring, and 
transporting; only around five percent will be in manufacturing or 
agriculture. Most Americans will change jobs and even careers more 
frequently than they do today. More Americans will work in jobs with 
low pay, will lose a job more than once during their careers, and will 
reach retirement age with little savings. Families, community organi-
zations, and labor unions might grow even weaker than they are now. 
But by filling in the gaps in the public safety net, the federal govern-
ment will improve economic security, equal opportunity, and shared 
prosperity for most Americans in spite of these changes. A social 
democratic America will be a society with greater economic security 
and fairness. Its economy will be flexible, dynamic, and innovative. 
Employment will be high. Liberty will be abundant. Balancing work and 
family will be easier. Americans will pay higher taxes than they cur-
rently do, but the sacrifice will be worth it, because they will receive 
a lot in return. 
The United States has come a long way on the road to becoming a 
good society, but it still has further to travel. Happily, its history and 
the experiences of other rich nations show the way forward. One 
reason the United States is a much better country today than it was 
a century ago is that the federal government does more to ensure 
economic security, equal opportunity, and shared prosperity. In the 
future, it will do more still, and the country will be better for it.∂
